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Abstract
The terminology of populism is often taken for granted, even though the very meaning 
of populism is quite unclear. The article approaches populism by exploring the meanings 
given to the term in the Nordic press during the first parliamentary elections of the 2010s in 
Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark. A combination of the quantitative content analysis 
and the qualitative frame analysis of the leading quality and popular papers is favoured. 
In the study of the use of populism in the British press the conclusion was that the term 
was used more or less explicitly in a pejorative way, although uses of the term varied and 
had no consistent logic. In the Nordic press recurring frames were found, but the mean-
ings given to populism were only fully understood in their political and cultural contexts. 
The different life phases of the domestic populist parties as well as differences in Nordic 
political cultures especially explain the variation in the usage of the term.
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Introduction
There is an agreement that populist movements have grown during the last few decades 
– in Europe and elsewhere. However, scholars have stated that the meaning of populism 
is unclear due to the vagueness or slipperiness of the concept (e.g. Canovan 1999: 3; 
Taggart 2000: 1; Mazzoleni 2003: 4). In many political cultures and languages the term 
“populism” carries negative rather than positive connotations (cf. Canovan 2005: 75; 
Andersson 2009: 8-9), even though the etymological background of the word, deriv-
ing from the Latin noun “populus” meaning “the people”, gives it an emancipative or 
empowering signification (cf. Williams 1988: 66).
This article approaches populism by exploring the meanings given to the term’s use in 
the Nordic press. This involves adopting a constructivist design to ask, How is populism 
signified? rather than an essentialist approach exploring, What is populism? Populism 
as an ideology or political style has been studied extensively, although analyses of the 
actual uses of the term in political discourse are rare. In fact, only Bale et al. (2011) have 
studied the use of the term by the press and compared it with scholarly usage, and their 
focus was solely on a quantitative content analysis of the UK print media. Therefore, 
this study brings comparative and qualitative approaches to research on the subject.
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The context of the study is four Nordic countries: Finland, Sweden, Norway and 
Denmark, which provide an interesting framework for this approach for three reasons. 
Firstly, a political party that has often been defined as “populist” has gained remark-
able success in all those countries during the twenty-first century. Secondly, the Nordic 
countries have remarkably similar media and political systems, and they are prominent 
representatives of the so-called Democratic-Corporatist Model in Hallin and Mancini’s 
categorization (Hallin & Mancini 2004; Strömbäck et al. 2008). Thirdly, despite their 
similarities, the geopolitical, cultural and language contexts of the Nordic countries vary, 
especially in their political cultures and in the formation of their populist movements 
(e.g. Fryklund 2016).
The article examines the meanings given to populism through a combination of quan-
titative content analysis and qualitative frame analysis of the leading quality and popular 
papers of Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark. The main objective of the study is to 
find new insights into the discussion on populism as a universal but simultaneously local 
phenomenon by analysing the construction of populism as a term in specific contexts. 
The study is also important because the public meanings of populism have real effects 
on politics and the success of populist movements. 
The research questions are:
RQ1. How is populism framed in its public portrayal within the Nordic press?
RQ2. How do frames differ between newspaper types and journalistic genres?
RQ3. How do different media and country contexts explain the framings?
The article starts with a short introduction to theories of populism and to the relationship 
between populism and the media. After introducing the contemporary Nordic populist 
parties, the method and materials of the study are discussed and the frame analysis of 
the usage of populism as a term in the Nordic press is reported (RQ1 and RQ2). The 
article ends with a discussion of the results (RQ3).
Defining populism
One way to define populism has been to consider it an ideology. As a political ideology, 
however, populism has been thought to be “a-political” (MacRae 1969: 157) or “thin” 
(Stanley 2008), since no solid ideological spine has been found from comparing different 
forms of populism (cf. Canovan 1981; Taggart 2000; Andersson 2009). Wiles (1969) 
described populism as “a syndrome” rather than “a doctrine” – a reaction to other po-
litical movements and their ideologies rather than an ideological starting point as such.
According to Canovan (1999: 3), an appeal to “the people” and opposing the estab-
lishment and its societal values have been the most common features of populism in 
modern democracies. Hence, populism differs from coherent ideological traditions or 
“full ideologies”, such as liberalism and socialism. Therefore, Stanley calls populism 
a “thin ideology”. For him, “the thinness of populism” – the fact that its core element 
is that of “anti-elite appeal” actually “ensures that in practice it is a complementary 
ideology; it does not so much overlap with as diffuse itself throughout full ideologies” 
(Stanley 2008: 106-107). 
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Another common definition of populism has considered it a political movement that 
arises during times of political crisis (see Laclau 2005; Andersson 2009). Thus, it can 
be defined as an anti-elite protest movement with no genuine ideological substance 
or political programme, carried out by a group calling themselves “the people” (see 
Rydgren 2005: 12-13). The problem of this definition is that the understanding of the 
people, the elite and the protest vary from context to context, thus the meaning of pop-
ulism remains unclear.
One way to try to solve the vagueness of populism is to reduce it to a political 
rhetoric or style. Jagers and Walgrave (2006: 322), for example, define populism as “a 
political communication style of political actors that refers to the people”. This is a thin 
understanding of populism, in which “populism is totally stripped from all pejorative 
and authoritarian connotations” (ibid.: 323). However, Jagers and Walgrave also analyse 
the “thick” definition of populism with its anti-establishment ideas and its simultane-
ous exclusion of certain population groups (ibid.: 322). Thus, understanding populism 
primarily as a style or rhetoric seems simplistic (Mazzoleni 2014: 46), leading Jagers 
and Walgrave (2006: 336-337) to conclude their analysis by emphasising populism as 
a combination of style and ideology.
Regarding historical forms of populism, many scholars have talked about neo-
populism as a specific phenomenon in contemporary Western democracies (e.g. Taggart 
2000; Mazzoleni 2003; Mudde 2007; Andersson 2009). Neo-populism is characterised 
as a protest movement that criticises bureaucratised states and the alleged corruption of 
established parties (Taggart 2000: 75; Andersson 2009: 48-54). It is also connected to 
anti-immigration policies, xenophobia and even racism promoted by extreme or radi-
cal right-wing movements (see Taggart 2000: 76-83; Rydgren 2004; Andersson 2009: 
64-76). However, not all researchers agree that neo-populism should be defined by 
right-wing extremism or nativist ideology (e.g. Laclau 2005; Andersson 2009). This is 
true also of Nordic populist parties, which do not necessary fit directly such definitions 
of neo-populism (Andersson 2009: 73-76; Herkman 2015).
Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012: 8) have tried to formulate a “minimal defini-
tion of populism”, and defined it as “a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be 
ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ 
and ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the 
volonté générale (general will) of the people”. Their definition eloquently combines 
most meanings given to the term in the research literature and it certainly helps to op-
erationalise the empirical analyses of the phenomenon. However, even this definition 
does not encompass all cases under the title of populism and, as a scholarly endeavour, 
it does not fix the meanings given to the term in public discussions.
Nordic populist parties and the media
In the Nordic countries included in this study, political parties with backgrounds as anti-
elite populist movements combined with nation-centric perspectives and criticism of 
immigration have enjoyed remarkable success in the twenty-first century. The Norwegian 
Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet, NFP) was the largest party in Norway in the early 
2010s, and joined the conservative government after the 2013 elections. The Finns Party 
(Perussuomalaiset, PS) was the second largest party in the 2015 parliamentary elections 
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of Finland. In Denmark, the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF) supported the 
conservative government between 2001 and 2011 and once again after the 2015 general 
elections. The Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, SD) won seats in the Swedish 
parliament in 2010 and in the 2014 parliamentary elections gained an astonishing 12.9 
per cent of votes, upsetting Sweden’s political status quo.
Those parties cannot be directly compared to the neo-populist movements of Western 
and Eastern Europe since, according to the European Social Survey (ESS), their sup-
porters are quite different and rely on a democratic society (Mesežnikov et al. 2008; 
Paloheimo 2012: 337). Populism in the Nordic countries has not been as radical or 
offensive as in countries where politics in general has been more confrontational (see 
Widfeldt 2010: 179). NFP and DF have become established political players, appear-
ing to be more mainstream than traditional populist movements in domestic contexts 
(cf. Herkman 2015). However, all these parties have intensely questioned immigration 
policies since the 1990s, thus linking them to the European populist radical right-wing 
party family (Jungar & Jupkåps 2014).
The importance of the media for the rise and development of the neo-populist move-
ments has been alleged and reported in several studies (e.g. Mazzoleni 2003; Boom-
gaarden & Vliegenthart 2006; Albertazzi & McDonnell 2008; Koopmans & Muis 2009; 
Roodjuin 2014). However, Bos and Brants (2014) indicate that the populist styles, ideas 
and policies represented in the media might be far less prevalent than often claimed. 
Some studies stress that media coverage is essential for the public images of all political 
leaders (Bos et al. 2011) and Pauwels (2010) reminds us that the media effect on the 
development of populist movements should not be overstated.
The meanings given to populism in studies on the Nordic countries have most com-
monly been tied to the ideological or social dimensions of the movements (e.g. Arter 
2010; Jungar 2010; Rydgren & Ruth 2011; Jungar & Jupkåps 2014). The majority of 
the media-based research has considered Nordic populism in relation to right-wing ex-
tremism and anti-immigration rhetoric (e.g. Rydgren 2004; Hellström & Nilsson 2010; 
Horsti & Nikunen 2012). However, the style of populism has also been studied (e.g. 
Niemi 2013), and in Finland and in Sweden the media portrayal of the domestic populist 
parties has been analysed with regard to the overall coverage of the elections (Pernaa & 
Railo 2012; Ljunggren & Nordstrand 2011).
The multiple definitions of populism have been considered in academic theorisa-
tions for several decades (Wiles 1969; Canovan 1981; Taggart 2000; Laclau 2005), but 
actual uses of the term have rarely been studied. The alleged pejorative use of the term 
has been stated (e.g. Canovan 2005; Andersson 2009), but few empirical studies of the 
subject have been published. Elmgren (2015) has studied the term’s use, but her focus 
was on the self-identification of the Finns Party. Only Bale et al. (2011) have explored 
the usage of the term in the media. They concluded that the term was used more or less 
explicitly in a pejorative way, although uses of the term varied and had no consistent 
logic. This study examines whether this is true in the Nordic context and considers the 
possible effects of the construction of the meaning of populism.
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Methods and materials
The material analysed in this article comes from articles collected during the first par-
liamentary elections of the 2010s in Finland (April 2011), Sweden (September 2010), 
Denmark (September 2011) and Norway (September 2013). The articles in which the 
term populism, or its variants, was explicitly used during a 30-day period surrounding 
the parliamentary elections – polling day plus 16 days before and 13 after that date – 
were sieved out from the largest quality and popular newspapers of the countries by 
using different domestic press archives. The search word used was “populis*” because 
it allowed us to encompass all variations of “populism”, “populist” and “populistic” in 
the Nordic languages. The sampling of the material was carried out by native research 
assistants with good track records in media and political studies from a total gather-
ing of 3337 journalistic articles discussing the elections (see Herkman 2015). In this 
study, news articles other than election stories, letters to the editor, readers’ comments 
and other non-journalistic articles were also included, thus increasing the total amount 
of articles in the search to almost 5000. In total, the material analysed here amounts 
to 170 articles sampled by using the search term “populis*”. After the assistants had 
collected and copied the articles from the archives, I proceeded with the coding and 
frame analysis.
Election campaigns create a particular moment for public discourse and may distort 
the material found by stressing political populism at the expense of, for example, “cul-
tural populism” (cf. McGuigan 1992). The chosen elections were especially interest-
ing, however, because a political party which was commonly termed “populist” gained 
remarkable success, consequently highlighting the term and the meaning given to it 
through the various public discussions in which it participated. PS attained 19.1 per 
cent of the votes in Finland, SD won seats in the Swedish parliament for the first time, 
and NFP joined the Norwegian cabinet for the first time in its history. Thus, the appear-
ance of “populist parties” can be said to have increased the public debate on populism.
The differing approaches of the elite and the tabloid media have usually been dis-
cernible from each other in studies on populism (see Mazzoleni 2003: 8). However, 
the Nordic countries do not have tabloid papers similar to those found in the Anglo-
American or Central European context. Sparks (2000: 15) defines Nordic tabloids as the 
“semi-serious press” in his pioneering analysis of “tabloidization” because they publish 
serious news content resembling that of the quality press. The term “tabloid” is also 
confusing, since many Nordic quality papers changed from broadsheet to tabloid format 
during the twenty-first century. However, according to their journalistic style and topics, 
the Nordic popular papers can be defined as a sort of tabloid media (cf. Jungar 2010: 
215-216). Accordingly I use the terms “quality” and “popular” press.
The papers analysed are Helsingin Sanomat (quality) and Ilta-Sanomat (popular) 
from Finland, Dagens Nyheter (quality) and Aftonbladet (popular) from Sweden, Poli-
tiken (quality) and Ekstra Bladet (popular) from Denmark and Aftenposten (quality) 
and Verdens Gang (popular) from Norway. There are no clear political affiliations in 
these papers today, although the quality papers usually represent more “liberal” and 
the popular papers more “conservative” values. However, their historical backgrounds 
might reproduce some left-of-centre tendencies in Politiken and Ekstra Bladet and 
right-of-centre tendencies in Dagens Nyheter and Aftenposten. Aftonbladet is defined 
as “independent social democratic”. 
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The articles using the term “populism” are first analysed quantitatively, but the main 
research method here is a qualitative frame analysis. In media studies, framing usually 
means the various strategies, practices and techniques by which the media or journalism 
bring meanings to the fore and the way certain aspects of reality are stressed and others 
are deemphasised (Gitlin, 1980: 7; Entman, 1993: 53). Media frames can be separated 
from audience frames, meaning the ways journalism represents and frames reality (de 
Vreese et al. 2001: 107). Audience frames, in turn, refer to the ways audiences receive 
and interpret the media. In this study, the focus is on the media frames the Nordic press 
uses to underline the meanings of populism.
First, the sentences and statements where the term populism, or its variants, were used 
was identified. Next, those sentences were classified according to the main meaning they 
(and the context of the story) constructed of populism. These significations constitute 
the media frames of populism as a “floating signifier” (cf. Laclau 2005; Herkman 2016).
Five main frames were found to indicate the ways the Nordic newspapers constructed 
meanings of populism: (1) the nationalism frame, (2) the nativism frame, (3) the empty 
rhetoric frame, (4) the political movement frame, and (5) the voice of the people frame. 
However, the frames overlapped somewhat, and the coding of the main frame was not 
always unambiguous. The nationalism and nativism frames, for example, were some-
times difficult to separate. In such cases, primary and secondary (or supplementary) 
frames were coded.
In the nationalism frame populism is understood as a project emphasising national tra-
ditions, history, language and culture. Within this frame, hostility towards “outsiders” 
is not important, instead populism is identified mainly as a nostalgic yearning for the 
“good old days”. Thus, the nationalism frame resonates intimately with Taggart’s (2000: 
95-97) idea of “heartland” as the core dimension of populism.
The nativism frame is close to the nationalism frame, but instead of positively identi-
fying with the nation, the nativism frame is focused on the negative and even hostile 
exclusion of others. Consequently, it is closely linked to definitions of contemporary 
neo-populism associated with the extreme or radical right, which attributes to populism 
xenophobic, racist and anti-immigration connotations (see Mazzoleni 2003: 4-5; Mudde 
2007; Andersson 2009: 48nn).
The empty rhetoric frame constructs populism as a political style that appeals to people 
through a down-to-earth rhetoric (cf. Jagers & Walgrave 2006; Niemi 2013). However, it 
also carries with it strong negative connotations connected to irresponsible policymaking 
and is commonly used pejoratively (see Bale et al. 2011). In this frame, populism refers 
to statements that do not result in actual political acts, trust or responsibility.
The political movement frame approaches populism in a more neutral manner. In this 
frame populism is used as a descriptive label to separate different political movements 
or parties from each other (cf. Andersson 2009: 5).
The voice of the people frame is the only clearly positive framing of populism. It accords 
with Laclau’s (2005) idea of populism as a manifestation of a political logic whereby a 
group of people identifies itself as “the people” in the meaning of political agency. This 
frame is also used by some (populist) politicians, when they announce themselves to be 
the voice of “the real people” (see Elmgren 2015).
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Framing populism
In general, the words “populism” or “populist” and their variants were seldom used; 
only about three per cent of the articles explicitly used the terms during the sample 
period. The result is similar to that found by Bale et al. (2011: 117) in the UK context, 
who state that “populism is almost never the central concept in news coverage”. It is 
also justifiable to argue that both journalists and politicians avoid using the term in the 
Nordic consensus-seeking context because it is a pejorative term rather than a neutral 
notion (Andersson 2009: 8-9).
More than one third of the articles mentioning populism were news articles (36.5 per 
cent). Editorials, opinion pieces, commentaries or columns amounted similarly to 37 per 
cent. If we take into account letters to editors and comment articles (13 per cent), then 
half of the story types mentioning populism were genres in which subjective evaluations 
and critique are typical. Similarly, the British press used the term more pejoratively in 
opinion pieces and commentaries than they did in news articles, which were usually 
neutral in style (Bale et al. 2011: 124).
Table 1. Number of articles mentioning populism in the different countries and genres 
 News Editorials /  Letters   
 articles columns to editors Other All
Sweden 26 22 2 10 60
Finland 26 18 8 8 60
Norway 4 10 8 3 25
Denmark 6 13 4 2 25
Total 62 63 22 23 170
Note: N=170.
The Swedish and Finnish press used the term more often than Danish and Norwegian 
press – 120 mentions in the Finnish and Swedish papers, but only 50 articles in the 
Danish and Norwegian papers (see Table 1). If we take into account the fact that Finn-
ish papers published the fewest election articles during the sample period and Danish 
papers the most (cf. Herkman 2015), the relative share of populism discussions was 
significantly higher in the Finnish press than in the other countries, especially Denmark.
A total of 167 primary and 52 secondary framings could be coded. The analysis was 
focused on political populism, but 12 articles (six in Sweden, three in Denmark, two in 
Finland, and one in Norway) of the 170 approached populism predominantly through 
the meaning of “cultural populism” (McGuigan 1992). In Sweden, for example, it was 
reported that the cultural taste promoted by political institutions or the media had become 
hostile towards the high arts and was more supportive of popular taste.
Cultural populism was also linked to politics through secondary framing, however. 
For example, in Dagens Nyheter politicians were criticised for favouring easy-going 
popular culture (16 September 2010) or being populist in their national film industry 
policies (23 September 2010). Thus, cultural populism did not appear as an independent 
frame as such but was diffused with the framings of political populism. Except for two 
articles (published in Aftonbladet and in Verdens Gang), cultural populism was only 
discussed in the quality papers.
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Table 2. Share of primary (and secondary) frames (%) in the different newspaper types 
Paper    Empty Political Voice of  
type/frame Nationalism Nativism rhetoric movement the people Total (%)
Quality 17 (14) 30 (11) 38 (5) 8 (2) 7 (1) 100 (33)
Popular 6 (8) 34 (3) 34 (5) 16 (6) 10 (5) 100 (27)
Mean 12 (11) 32 (7) 36 (5) 12 (4) 9 (3) 
Note: N=170.
In general, the quality papers favoured slightly more critical frames than the popular 
papers (see Table 2). Quality papers also concentrated more on the populism discus-
sion, especially after polling day in both Sweden and Denmark. The dominance of the 
quality papers regarding negative or critical framings (nationalism, nativism and empty 
rhetoric) supports the alleged difference in paper types and their relationship to populism 
(cf. Mazzoleni 2003: 8).
Table 3. Share of primary (and secondary) frames (%) in the different countries 
Country/   Empty Political Voice of  
frame Nationalism Nativism rhetoric movement the people Total (%)
Sweden 5 (8) 50 (5) 29 (3) 14 (3) 2 (2) 100 (21)
Finland 15 (25) 23 (9) 31 (7) 16 (7) 15 (5) 100 (53)
Norway 12 32 (8) 48 (8) – 8 100 (16)
Denmark 28 5 (16) 52 – 5 100 (16)
Mean 15 (8) 28 (10) 40 (5) 8 (3) 8 (2)
Note: N=170.
The national emphases found in the framings are shown in Table 3. However, more 
substantial qualitative analysis is needed to explore the ways the press constructs the 
meanings of populism. Therefore, a qualitative frame by frame analysis of the 170 
articles is made below.
The nationalism frame 
The nationalism frame was most emphasised by the Finnish papers, but it was also 
relatively popular in the Danish press (see Table 3). In Finland the frame often featured 
as a secondary framing with nativism, but in Denmark it was often used as the primary 
frame when discussing the lack of real European politics, for example, in a commentary 
article written by left-wing candidates who criticised Danish political discourse for being 
too parochial (Politiken 31 August 2011).
The nationalism frame was typically located in a non-domestic context rather than a 
domestic one, especially in Sweden, for example, when discussing the Belgian (Dagens 
Nyheter 9 September 2010) and Finnish (Dagens Nyheter 11 September 2010) contexts 
and when defining debates over minority language rights. Swedish newspapers generally 
favoured the nativism frame, however. In Finland the nationalism frame was popular in 
Helsingin Sanomat, especially in several editorials and commentaries. That frame was 
crystallised two days after the Finnish election in a column written by political journalist 
Olli Kivinen, who claimed that Asian-driven globalisation and the recession in Europe’s 
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economies had led to the rise of populist movements holding nostalgic ideas about the 
nation state (Helsingin Sanomat 19 April 2011).
The nativism frame
The nativism frame was popular, especially in Sweden, where populism has usually 
meant extreme right-wing movements. SD was commonly portrayed through this frame 
and criticised heavily in both the quality and popular papers. Dagens Nyheter (17 Sep-
tember 2010) stated before the elections that the world-famous Swedish soccer player 
Zlatan Ibrahimovic “is not Swedish for SD”, because in “SD’s biologically coloured 
world” structural discrimination against immigrants was promoted. Journalist Anna 
Lundell provocatively stated in her Aftonbladet column that “SD’s racist propaganda is 
bullshit” (10 September 2010).
The political discourse in the Swedish press generally criticised SD and other political 
parties also refused to collaborate with the party (cf. Rydgren, 2005: 117). Aftonbladet 
even announced a counter-campaign called “We like different people” (22 September 
2010) when SD entered parliament by attaining 5.7 per cent of all votes cast.
The Swedish press also framed populism as nativism in other European countries. 
Dagens Nyheter published several stories discussing extreme-right populism in the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Hungary, France and Lithuania, framing populism as 
inherently meaning xenophobic and anti-immigration policies. The leaders of the Eu-
ropean radical right-wing parties have repeatedly and routinely been associated with 
populism in the British press as well (Bale et al. 2011: 121). However, the Swedish 
popular paper, Aftonbladet, did not associate populism with foreign right-wing move-
ments but focused solely on SD; the focus of debate turning domestic also in Dagens 
Nyheter after the Swedish election.
The Finnish press partly resembled the Swedish model. Helsingin Sanomat published 
several articles about extreme-right movements around Europe before the elections 
but made no clear references to PS. After the unexpected success of the PS, Helsingin 
Sanomat often framed its articles with the type of criticism common to countries facing 
triumphant right-wing populists. However, popular paper Ilta-Sanomat barely used the 
nativism or nationalism frames.
The nativism frame was seldom used in the Danish papers, but if it was, it was 
used as a secondary frame accompanying the nationalism or empty rhetoric frames. In 
Norwegian papers the nativism frame was used relatively more often, but the majority 
of these articles debated whether the NFP was a populist party or not. The debate was 
especially promoted by the popular paper Verdens Gang in which the dominant argument 
was actually the “anti-nativism” of NFP; the writers stressed, unlike foreign media com-
mentators (who were reputed not to understand Norwegian politics) and some domestic 
dissidents, such as Heikki Holmås from the Socialist Left Party, that the NFP was not an 
extreme-right movement. The debate culminated in a press conference intended for the 
foreign press and covered extensively by Verdens Gang (19 September 2013).
The empty rhetoric frame
The empty rhetoric frame was favoured as a primary frame in all Nordic countries and in 
both the quality and popular papers, even though the nativism frame was more common in 
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Sweden. This was also the dominant frame in the British press, which used populism in a 
mostly pejorative way but with significant variation between the topics and actors (Bale 
et al. 2011). In the Nordic context, the empty rhetoric frame was slightly more common 
in the quality than the popular papers, being relatively more popular in Denmark – but 
only in Politiken in such articles as Lasse Jensen’s column which criticises Danish media 
policies (30 September 2011), or Peder Rasmussen’s critical commentary on the Danish 
government’s strategy for branding Denmark as one of the world’s leading design na-
tions (31 August 2011). The frame was quite often used with regard to foreign news like 
the European Central Bank’s action in the Euro crisis (Politiken 18 September 2011), or 
Antonios Samaras’ opposition policies in Greece (Politiken 21 September 2011).
It was typical of the empty rhetoric frame that it was used with a wide variety of top-
ics and with many different actors (cf. Bale et al., 2011). Whereas the nationalism and 
nativism frames were connected to Europe’s extreme right or to anti-immigration do-
mestic parties, the empty rhetoric frame was also used to describe domestic mainstream 
party politicians. The leading figures of both the mainstream left-wing and right-wing 
parties, respectively Mona Sahlin and Fredrik Reinfeldt, were said by Aftonbladet to 
use a “populist rhetoric” (12 September 2010). The leader of the Social Democratic 
Party and the Finnish Minister of Finance, Jutta Urpilainen, was called “a populist” in 
Ilta-Sanomat (6, 7, 14, 15 and 16 April 2011).
The empty rhetoric frame was also used to describe Norway’s concerns over the 
direction of modern politics, for example, in 15-year-old Jacob Schram’s commentary 
on why Norwegian youngsters had lost interest in politics (Aftenposten 22 September 
2013), or in Harald Reppensgaard’s opinions on the erosion of democracy in Norway. 
Reppensgaard argued that populist politicians sought media and opinion poll attention 
but lacked solid political principles (Verdens Gang 18 September 2013). Thus, the empty 
rhetoric frame usually signified populism in a pejorative way by referring to the sup-
posedly empty political promises of political leaders.
The political movement frame
The political movement frame approached populist parties in a more neutral way. It 
was only used in Sweden and Finland, which can be partly explained by the fact that 
populism was discussed more often in the Swedish and Finnish papers than in Denmark 
or Norway. A further explanation is that SD and PS were gaining political ground in the 
beginning of the 2010s and there was a need to distinguish them from other parties in 
news stories. NFP and DF were more established in their countries, hence there was no 
need for the press to label them (see Herkman 2015).
The political movement frame was especially common in Helsingin Sanomat’s news 
stories, in which PS was considered one party amongst others in an analysis of an online 
candidate selector, a Web-application in which voters can test candidates with the help 
of their questionary responses before the elections (Helsingin Sanomat 20 April 2011), 
or in a story analysing why the Centre Party lost votes so heavily (Helsingin Sanomat 22 
April 2011). This framing was also used in Ilta-Sanomat, though it generally favoured 
the voice of the people frame.
The political movement frame was also used to discuss the Swedish minority govern-
ment’s challenges regarding the exercise of successful financial policies with a populist 
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movement (e.g. Dagens Nyheter 20 and 21 September 2010). However, in articles about 
SD the nuance was usually negative, such as when the prime minister asked: “Can we 
call on Jimmie Åkesson [SD’s leader] in times of economic recession?” (Dagens Nyheter 
18 September 2010).
The voice of the people frame
Finally, the voice of the people frame was the only clearly positive media frame for 
populism, and it was the least common in the articles. In this frame, the media portrayed 
“the people” with the same kind of signifier as Laclau (2005) in his theory of populist 
reason. For example, after the elections, Dagens Nyheter published an article in which 
the supporters of SD from Skånean Almgården were allowed to speak for themselves 
(21 September 2010). Moreover, in another interview article Per Westerberg from the 
right-wing Moderate Coalition Party advised readers to respect “the Swedish people’s 
vote” (Dagens Nyheter 22 September 2010).
The Norwegian papers also published two articles in which the possibility of defining 
populism more positively from the viewpoint of “the people” was discussed, whereas 
in Finland this frame was mainly discussed by Ilta-Sanomat, which published several 
post-election articles introducing the new members of parliament or PS’s supporters. 
Ilta-Sanomat portrayed PS’s parliamentarians in the story “They Are Like This” (18 
April 2011), in which an MP declared “he is a proud populist” and that “for him, pop-
ulism means democracy”. In the same issue, a major article about PS’s election gala 
appeared with the headline: “The Forgotten People Triumphed”.
Ilta-Sanomat (19 September 2011) then interviewed newly elected Johanna Jurvanen 
(PS), whose political aim was to enhance the social security of the disadvantaged. 
Jurvanen was labelled a populist who “immigrants, gays and culture enthusiasts need 
not fear”. Furthermore, in a column published on 23 April 2011 Ilta-Sanomat declared, 
“Even the populist party [in Finland] is moderate, house-broken and cooperative.”
Conclusion and discussion
As in the British context (Bale et al. 2011), the Nordic papers seldom used the word 
populism, even though a political party generally termed a populist movement gained 
a significant share of the vote in the first elections of the 2010s. The avoidance of the 
term becomes clear when considered in comparison with all the other election stories 
published during the same period, in which more than 40 per cent discussed the domes-
tic populist parties (Herkman 2015). Thus, most of these stories discussed the parties 
without using the term populism. The avoidance of the term would perhaps be an even 
more accurate observation during periods when no electoral campaign was in progress. 
Furthermore, when the term populism was used, its meanings were mainly constructed 
within negative framings. The word’s negative and pejorative connotations, in turn, limit 
its use by politicians and journalists, especially in Nordic consensus democracies, which 
have a modest political style and a rather “politics friendly media” (cf. Nord 2007). 
Bale et al. (2011) indicate that the term “populist” was used pejoratively in the UK 
press by many commentators but that the meaning of populism varied so much that no 
common definition could be found. The use of the term in the Nordic press finds a similar 
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range of meanings. However, five dominant frames – nationalism, nativism, empty rheto-
ric, political movement and voice of the people – reveal recurring themes. The empty 
rhetoric frame was most often linked with populism and a broad range of subjects. The 
other frames usually connected populism to contemporary political movements. In par-
ticular, the nationalism and nativism frames linked populism to Europe’s extreme-right 
movements and/or assessed domestic populist parties from this perspective. However, 
the differences between the countries and the newspapers emphasise that the meanings 
given to populism can only be fully understood in their political and cultural contexts.
The Finnish and Swedish papers explicitly discussed populism more often than their 
Norwegian and Danish counterparts. This is explained by the different life phases of 
the domestic populist parties; PS and SD were experiencing their “insurgent phases” 
(Stewart et al. 2003: 219-220) in entering parliament, whereas DF had assisted con-
servative governments for two terms and NFP had been a prominent player in Norway’s 
political arena for decades. Therefore, DF and NFP were experiencing their “established 
phases”, suggesting their populism was no longer an issue as their media attention had 
been “normalised” (ibid: 223).
The Swedish papers stressed the nativism frame, which anchored populism to xeno-
phobic and racist extreme right-wing movements (cf. Mudde 2007). That can be partly 
explained by the fact that SD differs from other Nordic populist parties as its roots lie in 
the National Socialist movement (Baas 2014). Another explanation is that populism, in 
the Swedish political discourse, is mostly used to refer to right-wing populism (höger-
populism), linking populism with racist and fascist connotations (Andersson 2009: 14, 
54) and leading Sweden’s quality and popular papers to agree a cordon sanitaire – an 
exclusion of SD from the agenda setting (Andersson 2009: 47; Rydgren 2005: 117).
In the Danish press the nationalism frame connected discussions about populism to 
domestic political decision-making, but the extreme-right connotations of nativism were 
uncommon and not used in relation to DF. This is interesting because this study’s Danish 
newspapers had left-of-centre tendencies, which might have been thought to increase 
their use of populism in a pejorative way against right-wing movements (cf. Bale et al. 
2011: 125). In general, populism terminology was rare in Denmark, either because it was 
unusable or was purposely avoided. This might indicate that the long-term influence of 
DF on immigration policies had, for example, normalised such policies, meaning they 
were no longer discussed in relation to European neo-populism (cf. Rydgren 2010; Bay 
et al. 2013). 
The nativism frame was relatively common in Norway, but was used to prove the 
anti-nativism and thus anti-populism of NFP rather than to frame the party as xenophobic 
or racist. Consequently, most debates on populism in the Norwegian press reflected the 
domestic political environment, which was, according to the debaters, “misunderstood” 
abroad.
The Norwegian case reveals the “here–elsewhere” dimension in public discussions 
on populism. Due to populism carrying negative connotations, it is located outside the 
domestic environment. This contrasts with the British case, where the pejorative use of 
the term was more common in the domestic than the foreign news context (Bale et al. 
2011: 124), possibly resulting from the different journalistic and political cultures of 
the UK and the Nordic countries. In Swedish and Finnish quality newspapers, populism 
was critically approached in the pre-election period through foreign examples of Eu-
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ropean right-wing radicalism, but after the election, the approach focused on domestic 
right-wing radicalism.
The Finnish press differed from other countries in often favouring the neutral and 
positive frames of political movement and the voice of the people. However, the positive 
meanings of populism were promoted almost solely by the popular paper Ilta-Sanomat, 
while Helsingin Sanomat favoured neutral frames. Thus, the Finnish case demonstrates 
that a clear difference between the quality and tabloid media could be made (cf. Maz-
zoleni 2003: 8).
The public meanings of populism are interesting not only because they reveal dif-
ferences in national political and journalistic cultures, but also because they may have 
real political effects. Firstly, since the media have power in political agenda setting (see 
Walgrave & Van Aelst 2006; Van Dalen & Van Aelst 2013), media frames can influence 
politics because they assess political actors through populism, especially during election 
campaigns. Secondly, the analysis of the public or vernacular use of populism contex-
tualises the academic usage of the term, in which negative and normative connotations 
are generally more frequent (Bale et al. 2011: 115). Thus, this analysis of the meanings 
given to populism increases our understanding of the phenomenon on both a theoretical 
and an empirical level, even though further study is required to obtain knowledge from 
different contexts.
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